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iutcrfere with the cxillh'rfei'P!H'(' oeeur,
ih(• ('01trt to
the doctor with a reason-

of the nature
court, in
with the
iug her to submit to an oral and physical examinathe presenee of her
,
an unwareondition
her
to have the case proceed to
Let a writ of mandate issue directing respondent court to
allow the case to be tried without requiring plaintiff to submit
to a medieal examination in the absenee of her attorney.

,J., Carter, .T., rrraynor, J.,
J., concurred.
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TilE PBOPLB, Hespoudent, v. IIAlWLD JACKSON et aL,
A ppellan ts.
[] 1 Kidnaping-Evidence.- In prosecution for kidnaping for ran~om or
determination of jury that bodily harm was
inllicted on victim so as to warrant imposition of death penalty
e:mnot lw
where only eYidence of injury to victim is
that his wrists were bound tightly by chains so as to "cut in"
and
to some extent circulation of blood, where there
of skin and his captors loosened chains when
of their being tight, where he was allowed to
was
food, cigars, etc., and where, at time of his
he stated that lw felt "wonderful."
[2] Id.-Review.--,fudgments imposing death penalty and life imwithout possibility of parole, for kidnaping for
ransom or reward, wt>n~ reversed with directions to trial court
to
on f'ach defendant sentence of life imprisonment
was guilty of such misconduct as repeatedly
roir dire Pxamination of prosprdin jurors that
is a drath case~," conYcyiug to jury his belief that bodily
harm had been suffered by victim, mnking comments indicating
SeP Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Kidnaping,§ 2.1; Am.
Jur.,
§§ 2, 7 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Kidnaping, § 7; [2] Kidnaping, § 9.
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I'EOPLE 1' •• JACKS():'\

C.2d
in~tnwtion~

three of
ddendants' counst>l; where
torncv was
of Rnch misconduct as
repc•ated
refcr~nC('S to other notorious kidnaping ca~cs and rden·nces to
matters outside
examination
other
assertPd criminal acts
defendants which could have heen
lllndf~
for purpose of
their character; and
wrwre. if case was not one in
of eredible cvidenec
tended to pstab lish defendants'
under another count
would he reyersed in their entirety.

APPE.\LS ( mw automatically takeu Ullcl<>r Pen.
from a judgment of the Superior Coul't of: the City and
Com1ty of San l<1 raneisco and from orders denying a new trial.
Twain l\Iiche1sen, ,Tndgc. Reyersed \Vith directions.

? l2i19)

Prosecution for kidnaping for ransom and reward. ,Judgment of convietion imposing death penalty and life imprisonment \Yithout possibility of parole, rewrsed \vith dircetions;
orders affirmed.
Valentine C.
,J aekson.

IIamma~:;k

aml Sidney Feinberg for Appellant

Franees Newell Carr and Hobert K. ·winters for Appellant
Lear.
Edmull(l 0. Bro\Yn, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
A;.;sistant A tt onH'y General, Haymom1 M. Momboisse, Deputy
.c\ttorney General, Thomas C. I1ynch, District Attorney (City
anr1 County of San Franciseo), and Norman Elkington, Assistant Distrid AHorney, for Hespom1ent.
EDMONDS, J.--Harold Jackson and Joseph IJear were
tried jointly upon an indictment which charged that they
kidnaped Leonard Moskovitz for ransom or reward, inflicting
bodily harm upon the victim. A second count of the indictment alleged that they conspired to commit the crime and
that they were armed with a deadly weapon when it was
eommitted. ,Jackson's prior conviction of a felony was also
pleaded. A jury fonnd both men guilty as charged and
made no reeommendation as to the penalty.
The death sentence was imposed upon Jackson. The trial
judge ordered ''that the verdict of the jury be modified''

evening,
44

m the
niC:SC(mc:e in their
Extensive discussions were had at that time between
Jackson and Leonard as to the method of delivering the money. Leonard
them that the rn·PvtnT1<!
plan was ''too complicated,''
instead that they
contact his brother. After some
Jackson and Lear
agreed.
drove that
to a public
where
r~eonard was allowed to talk to Alfred.
were
later.
made to communicate with the
'When they
to
there
the method
be followed for
ransettled upon a
which the money was
in two
and delivered to a specified
telephone booth. Leonard \vas returned unchained and unbound to the bedroom -vvhile Lear left
make a
while
to do so. Upon
call. He was
interrogation
he admitted the kidnaping
and directed them to Jackson and Leonard. "\Vhen the officers broke into the
found ,Jackson in the
room, clad
in his
and !Jeonard
in a closet
in the bedroom.
Jackson's defense was that the asserted
was a
hoax devised to extort money from Leonard's father. According to the evidence
he had known Leonard
for several years. He had met with Leonard a few months
before the
to work out a
for accomplishing it. He denied that Leonard had been chained other
than on the first day at the house.
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kid-

the punishreward, extorprovide that one
death or shall be punished
life without possithe jury trying the
persons subjected to
harm or shall be
for life with

''unharmed.''
'l'he uncertainties of the federal statute were the subject
comment in Robinsou v. United
324 U.S. 282 [65
S.Ct.
89 L.Ed.
,
a
under that
net. There the evidence' showed that the victim had suffered
two violent blmys on the head with an iron

hom

of a
upon whether his victim has been

~

is a death case,"

the ontset of the
were
the derecase" and stated that
the jurors would be ''
of law; that is the
\Vhen the defense called
at a conversation to which
Lear, she stated that
was unable
the conversation without
to her
that she be
allowed to refresh her recollection
1mpeaching others
to the <HWH•DY'~"
the whole of it was denied.
the counsel an
to have the statement and to
impeach Inspector Ahern if he wishes
or if he thinks he
can, but we are
to resist
to
a copy of
that statement of ,Joe Lear before Mr. Lear has taken the
stand.''
added.)
During cross-examination of the
\Vitness connsel for Lear stated that he was "at a loss to understand''
something the witness had said.
say you are at loss to
as far as the
1s
concern what your
You are not
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the position
a trick in your
he denied saying
was: ''There may
said about a tricky
of similar misconduct
P.2d 308,
544
reversed upon that ground.
attorney referred
him to produce
a copy
"He doesn't
have
any more than he bas to disclose any segment of his
You know that; that is what
case on bebal£ of the
for a long while. . . . ''
after the noon recess had been
UV0"""'""' all of the defense counsel of "laugh, and '
and joking," saying: "Let
the record show that I don't observe
funny about
this.''
drnied that tl1ere had been any such conduct,
that one of them bad extended an invitation to
and
another for lunch. The record does not show what \Yas said
among defense
but neither does it substantiate the
's accusation nor indlcate any actions which would
the
's remarks before the
59 of the 63 instrucCounsel for Lear re44 instructions; two of them were allowed. Only
of the 37
,Jackson was given. In
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be aceonkd a fair amt
trial. In my
the
of that tradii ion is of greater
of the .American way of life than
other
that immortal document.
'fhere can be
doubt that this tradition has been desecrated
the conduct of the trial
and the
in this
as disclosed
the record and set forth
could have no other effect than to
defendants of every semblance of a fair and
trial.
that evidence of the
of the
defendants may be
I can see no other conclusion than that
'Sere denied a fair and
trial
and that article VI, section
of the Constitution of California cannot be construed to uphold a verdict and judgment rendered in such an atmosphere of prejudice and unfairness.
I would therefore reverse the judgments and
each
of the defendants a new trial.
'l'RAYNOH, J.-I dissent.
'fhe record of the misconduct of the trial judge and proseattorney as set forth in the majority opinion demonstrates that defendants were denied a fair and impartial
trial. Because of the abundant evidence that defendants
wt·re guilty of kidnaping, it is contended that they could not
have been prejudiced in the determination of this issue.
''
of their guilt,
they ·were entitled to a
trial. (Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
[43 S.Ct. 265, 67 hEel. 543]; see concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Jackson in Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50
[71 S.Gt. 549, 95 L.Ed. 740] .) 'Neither can a plea for the
application of
VI, § 41j2 ] of the constitution save this
situation. The fact that a record shows a defendant to be
guilty of a crime does not necessarily determine that there
has been no
of justice. In this ease the defendant
did not have the fair trial guaranteed to him by law and
the constitution.'
v.
201 Cal. 618, 627
P. 607].)"
v. McKay, 87 Ca1.2d
798
P.2d
.)
Sthaner, J., concurred.
The petitions of appellants and respondent for a rehearing
were denied May 25, 1955. Carter, ,J., 'l'raynor, J., and
Schauer, J., were of the opinion that the petitions should be
granted.

